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The Iraq war is over, no weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) have yet been found, and the presi-
dent’s smallpox plan, though sound, is running out
of steam. Instead of being well on the way to pro-
tecting the nation’s civilian population by vaccinat-
ing up to 10 million health, emergency, and public
safety workers, we are stalled at 37,971 vaccinated
civilians while the military has successfully and safe-
ly vaccinated more than 450,000 people. Moreover,
whether or not WMD are found in Iraq, it is only
one of a number of nations on the list of suspects. 
Of all biological weapons, smallpox has the great-
est potential for doing widespread harm. Given that
the risk of death or serious harm to anyone from any
form of terrorism is very low, we should live our daily
lives normally, not in fear. However, to do that we need
to be sure that our government is taking effective steps
to reduce the chances of terrorism and, when it occurs,
to minimize its consequences. Even though there is
enough vaccine for everyone, we are ill prepared to
rapidly contain smallpox after a bioterrorist release. 
Although Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) guidelines have recently
improved, they continue to overstate the risk of side
effects of the vaccine and erroneously suggest that,
after an attack, the techniques used decades ago to
eradicate smallpox will work well today. 
Medicine and public health are very risk-averse
professions in our risk-averse culture. We have not
yet realized the complexity and difficulty of vaccinat-
ing millions of Americans rapidly after an attack.
Nor have we come to grips with the need to make
rapid, possibly draconian, post-attack decisions
based on limited data of uncertain quality. That type
of decisionmaking runs counter to the culture of
public health.
The Bush administration needs to revitalize our
preparations for a smallpox bioterrorist event.
September 5, 2003
The President’s Plan
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
followed by several anthrax mailings in the fall
of 2001, forced many Americans to recognize
their vulnerability to various bioterrorist
threats. Smallpox, in particular, had a long
history as a devastating disease before its erad-
ication in the 1970s. Recently, it has captured
the attention of homeland security planners,
who view it as one of the most likely and dead-
liest agents for bioterrorism. Federal govern-
ment officials initially considered a program
of modest pre-exposure vaccination to protect
against deliberate release of the smallpox virus
by bioterrorists.1 That approach was superced-
ed when the White House announced a more
ambitious plan on December 13, 2002.
Phase I of the president’s plan called for the
voluntary vaccination of approximately 500,000
health workers, 18 years old and older, by mid-
January 2003.
Phase II called for the voluntary vaccina-
tion of up to 10,000,000 health and emer-
gency workers in the following 90 days.
Phase III, to begin in mid-2003, would
make the vaccine available to, but not recom-
mended for, the general adult population.
The plan also called for the immediate vac-
cination of up to 500,000 members of the
armed forces.2 As of June 25, 2003, the military
had vaccinated more than 450,000 individuals;
the civilian program had vaccinated only
37,971 people by July 18. Some states had sus-
pended their programs while awaiting guid-
ance from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) on how to screen for cardiac
conditions. In the District of Columbia, 105
people have been vaccinated, in Chicago 70,
and in Massachusetts 120.3 The civilian num-
bers are not reassuring.
What Are the Specific Objectives of Pre-
Exposure Vaccination?
We have not found the specific objectives
clearly articulated in any one place. From var-
ious White House, Department of Health and
Human Services, and CDC announcements,
we glean these probable objectives: 
Phase I
• Vaccinate sufficient vaccinators so that,
if there is an attack using smallpox, the
entire country can be vaccinated within
10 days.
• Vaccinate sufficient first responders to
identify, pick up, and transport patients
with suspected smallpox to hospitals.
• Vaccinate enough hospital workers in
acute care hospitals so that, if a hospital
receives a smallpox patient, it will be able
to use staff personnel who are immune
to smallpox to treat that patient. 
Phase II
• Vaccinate as many additional acute care
workers as possible to decrease the trans-
mission of smallpox in hospitals and to
ensure that essential emergency medical,
police, and fire services can continue
without emergency workers being either
at risk of smallpox or at risk of transmit-
ting smallpox. Once Phase II is complet-
ed, whether the event is small and inept
or major and multifocal, the nation will
be well prepared to rapidly respond to
and stop an outbreak of smallpox. 
Phase III
• In mid-2003, after Phase II is completed,
permit, but do not recommend, vaccina-
tion of any healthy adult. This approach
both allows informed adults to make
their own risk/benefit decision and
increases population immunity.
When Phases I and II are completed, whether
the event is small and inept or major and multi-
focal, the nation will be well prepared to rapidly
respond to and stop an outbreak of smallpox. If
and as the general adult public opts for volun-
tary vaccination in Phase III, post-exposure con-
trol becomes even easier and faster. There will be
fewer people to vaccinate, and, as the number of
people susceptible to smallpox will be reduced,
disease transmission will be slowed. 
Does the President’s Plan Make Sense?
The answer is yes. Why is the plan sensible?
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First, it is phased and selective. Limiting vacci-
nation to healthy adults dramatically reduces
the risk of serious vaccine side effects. Second,
by starting with 500,000 military personnel
and a similar number of civilians, we develop
current data about the risks of vaccination
and can easily modify the plan if actual risks
exceed those expected. Third, when Phase II is
complete, there will be enough people vacci-
nated to vaccinate the balance of the popula-
tion on a voluntary basis within 10 days from
the time the first case is identified. Finally, and
of great importance, hospitals and emergency
services will be able to continue to operate
while intensive mass vaccination is taking
place. After an outbreak is recognized, the vast
majority of people are highly likely to accept
voluntary vaccination. At that point there will
probably be no need for mandatory vaccina-
tion and its attendant problems.4
The pre-attack plan is correctly limited to
healthy adults, as the risk of serious complica-
tions and death from vaccination is substan-
tially higher in children. However, the age for
vaccination could safely be dropped to 10
years, as the overwhelming majority of deaths
and severe complications from vaccination
occur in children 9 years of age or younger.5 If
we are prepared to vaccinate rapidly after an
attack, children can be isolated at home for a
few days until they can be vaccinated. This
approach avoids a number of serious and
some fatal complications of vaccination in
children that would likely occur if done pre-
attack, while minimizing smallpox cases and
deaths post-attack.
Why Is the Plan Stalled?
The problems are not exclusive to any one
group or agency. The administration, as we dis-
cuss in more detail below, has never provided
clear objectives or the rationale underlying the
plan. Once announced, the plan was perceived
by many people as not being a high priority for
the administration. That perception was
heightened when liability and compensation
issues were addressed too late and little atten-
tion was paid to concerns about funding hos-
pitals and health departments for costs related
to vaccination. In addition, many medical and
public health professionals continue to make
three mutually reinforcing errors:
• Not distinguishing between the risk of vac-
cination in healthy, well-screened adults and
the risk to children and high-risk adults. 
• Not adequately recognizing the difference
between naturally occurring disease and
disease introduced by bioterrorism. For
example, no one has epidemic-control
experience with smallpox in a nonim-
mune, highly mobile population where
exposure will be malicious rather than
benign. The relevance of lessons from the
eradication experience (characterized by
very different circumstances) is limited.
• Not sufficiently appreciating that the
decision to undertake pre-exposure vac-
cination is far more than a medical deci-
sion about the risks of vaccination. Of
equal or greater importance, it involves
social, economic, and national security
considerations, as shown schematically
in Figure 1.
It is important to emphasize that assessing
the risk of attack is a national intelligence esti-
mate, not a medical or public health estimate. 
Before addressing in greater depth the rea-
sons why the plan is stalled, it is necessary to
review the nature of the threat and some facts
about the risks of vaccination. 
The Threat
Smallpox (variola major) is a deadly scourge
with, at present, no known treatment. It has an
overall mortality rate in the unvaccinated of 30
percent and leaves 60 percent to 80 percent of
all survivors permanently disfigured. Smallpox
has death rates in the very young and the elder-
ly approaching 50 percent. An effective live
virus vaccine is available that rarely results in
death but somewhat less rarely causes severe
complications. 
3
The decision to
undertake 
pre-exposure 
vaccination is far
more than a 
medical decision
about the risks of
vaccination. It
involves social,
economic, and
national security
considerations.
The last naturally occurring case of small-
pox was identified in 1977 in Somalia, and
the last case, a laboratory accident, occurred
in England in 1978.6 The United States and
Britain already had stopped routine child-
hood vaccination in the early 1970s. The
world was declared free of smallpox in 1980
by the World Health Organization.7
Smallpox had been weaponized by the
Soviet Union.8 Weaponized virus may have
been taken from the former Soviet Union,
and stocks of virus may not have been
destroyed by some countries, as called for by
WHO in the late 1970s.9 The former WHO
director of smallpox eradication, Dr. D. A.
Henderson, summarized the threat in 1999:
“One can only speculate on the probable
rapidity of spread of the smallpox virus in a
population where no one younger than 25
years of age has ever been vaccinated and
older persons have little remaining residual
immunity.”10 The former deputy director of
the Soviet Biological Weapons Program con-
siders it certain that North Korea possesses
the smallpox virus and probable that Iraq
does, too.11 Vaccination of North Korean and
Iraqi troops has also been reported.12
Bioterrorism, particularly with smallpox,
became a pressing U.S. and international issue
after September 11, 2001. The call for pre-expo-
sure vaccination came quickly. The head of
Russia’s Vektor Institute, which has functions
similar to those of the CDC, urged widespread
immunization against smallpox.13 The British
government bought enough vaccine for 50 per-
cent of the population. Germany purchased 6
million doses, and Israel vaccinated approxi-
mately 18,000 first responders and medical
workers. The U.S. government considered the
threat sufficient to purchase vaccine and vac-
cinia immune globulin (VIG) for all Americans
in preparation for a possible smallpox attack.
By late 2002 the United States had sufficient
smallpox vaccine to immunize and VIG to
manage the complications of vaccination for
the entire population.14
It is tempting to think that, with the
Saddam Hussein regime gone, the risk of a
bioterrorism attack by any agent is substan-
tially reduced. That may be the case. However,
it is also plausible that the escaping Iraqi
regime took away small but sufficient
amounts of smallpox virus for bioterrorism
purposes and has long since sequestered them
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Figure 1
The Weight of the Evidence
in jurisdictions far from Iraq. Furthermore,
the smallpox risk has never been thought to be
limited to the Hussein regime. In any case, as
was true before the Iraq war, the decision
regarding post-Iraq smallpox as a national
security risk is for the intelligence community
to assess, not for medical and public health
personnel. Those personnel need to consider
other types of risks.
The Risks of Vaccination
What Is the Real Risk of Vaccinating
Healthy Adults?
There are three particularly relevant histor-
ical data sources. The 1963 and 1968 U.S.
national vaccination surveys include the num-
ber of persons vaccinated by age, vaccination
status, and type of complication.15 The review
by Lane et al. of vaccine deaths in the United
States from 1959 to 1966 and 1968 details vac-
cine complications, but, as the data were not
available for all years studied, it does not spec-
ify the total number of persons vaccinated.16
Considering all adults and children, both first-
time and repeat vaccinees, 14,014,000 people
were vaccinated in 1963 with seven deaths,
and, in 1968, 14,168,000 with nine deaths. As
vaccination was being done routinely, there is
no reason to think that either more or fewer
people were vaccinated in years other than
1963 and 1968. Lane found 68 deaths or an
average of 7.5 deaths a year for the nine years
he studied. It seems reasonable to conclude
that the historical risk of death (adult and
child) is closer to 1 death per 2 million than
the 1 or 2 deaths per million that CDC con-
tinues to report.17
As the current national plan is limited to
voluntary vaccination of healthy adults 18 and
older, it is particularly appropriate to look at
the probability of deaths and complications in
this age group. Lane found two primary vacci-
nees in the 10-to-19-year age group who died of
postvaccinial encephalitis (PVE). One of those
was 14 and is reported in the 1963 data. The
other death did not occur in either 1963 or
1968, and the age cannot be determined. To be
conservative, we assume this person was in the
15-to-19-year age group. Lane also found two
revaccinated adults who died of PVE (a 33-year-
old woman and a 64-year-old man), both with-
out underlying disease. As previously noted,
vaccination was routine and ongoing for the
nine years Lane studied. Therefore, we assume
roughly the same number of persons were vac-
cinated in each of the years studied.
Extrapolating from the numbers reported in
1963 and 1968 for ages 15–19 and for ages 20
and older, 10,405,000 individuals were vacci-
nated, for an average of 5,202,500 per year, or a
total of just over 46,000,000 for nine years.18 To
be conservative, we round down to 45,000,000,
giving an estimated risk of PVE in adults of 3
per 45,000,000 or about 1 per 15,000,000. This
is an exceedingly low risk. Even if this estimate
is too low by half, the risk is still extremely
small. 
What about other vaccine-related deaths
in primary vaccinees and revaccinees in the
15-and-over age group? There were a total of
five other deaths, all of revaccinees, for the
nine-year study period: three had leukemia,
one had Hodgkin’s disease, and one had a
connective tissue disease (scleroderma) and
was on steroids. Today, because of our appre-
ciation of their increased risk and the atten-
dant careful screening, people with those and
similar diseases should be screened out as
ineligible for vaccination. 
What about serious complications with
long-term effects other than death? A careful
review of historical and current data sup-
ports the conclusion that when healthy
adults are vaccinated, persistent, serious side
effects are extremely rare.
In summary, in a nine-year period, eight
adults died (three of PVE with no underlying
disease, five others with underlying disease).
The death rate in healthy adults may be as low
as 1 in 15,000,000 vaccinees. It is quite possi-
ble, and would not be surprising, that when
Phase II of the national plan is completed, we
will have no deaths of persons voluntarily vac-
cinated, and it is likely we will have fewer than
five deaths. The current U.S. military experi-
ence with 454,856 vaccinated personnel as of
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June 11, 2003, (71 percent were primary vacci-
nees and 29 percent were revaccinees) with no
deaths and no long-lasting complications
strongly supports the conclusion that vaccina-
tion of healthy adults is safe. 
Accidental Vaccination of Patients,
Family Members, and Other Contacts
Accidental vaccination may occur when a
recently vaccinated person (whose vaccina-
tion scab has not yet fallen off) comes into
physical contact with an unvaccinated person
and transfers vaccinia virus from the vaccina-
tion site to the unvaccinated person. That can
happen when the site on a recently vaccinated
person rubs against another person or a
recently vaccinated person touches the site
and then touches a susceptible person. The
classic situation is two children playing
together in a sandbox and rubbing up against
each other.
Accidental vaccination is a particular con-
cern today, because we have a far higher num-
ber of persons whom we would deliberately
not vaccinate pre-outbreak (for example,
transplant recipients, as well as many patients
on cancer chemotherapy, on systemic steroids,
or infected with HIV/AIDS). Further, it is
believed that eczema19 is substantially more
common in the general population today
than it was 30 or 40 years ago. Individuals suf-
fering from eczema are  more likely to get acci-
dentally infected with vaccinia virus by close
contact with a recently vaccinated family
member, friend, or caregiver.20 The conse-
quences could be very serious, even fatal. 
How big is this risk? The 1963 and 1968
data show that there were 200 reported cases
of accidental infections of other persons as a
consequence of vaccinating 28,182,000 per-
sons. Only 25 cases, or 12.5 percent, occurred
in adults, with no deaths. Historically, well
over 90 percent of accidental vaccination of
others occurs either from child to child or
from child to caregiver or vice versa.21 Lane
reports one case of a recently vaccinated nurse
caring for a child with severe eczema and one
of a recently vaccinated adult woman who
slept with and infected a man. Both the child
and the man acquired vaccinia.22 Today the
nurse would use a double semipermeable
membrane dressing (described in the next
paragraph), wear long sleeves, and not be
working on a unit with such a child until the
vaccination scab had fallen off, by which time
the nurse would no longer be shedding virus.
The other case would be harder to prevent, but
the semipermeable dressing would reduce the
risk of transmission by 95 percent. Under the
Bush plan, health care professionals are not
vaccinating children today, and they are urg-
ing people with children who have eczema at
home either not to get vaccinated or to avoid
close contact with the children until their vac-
cination scabs fall off.
The already low risk of accidental vaccina-
tion of another person can be reduced further
by careful screening and the use of the inex-
pensive and readily available semipermeable
membrane dressing. Because there is appropri-
ate concern about accidental transmission to
others, particularly the immunocompromised,
reducing the shedding of virus from the vacci-
nation site into the environment to the lowest
possible levels makes sense. Shedding of virus
after vaccination can occur until the scab dries
and falls off the vaccination site (about 21
days). The semipermeable membrane dressing,
available commercially as “Tegaderm+Pad”
from 3M and “OpSite” from Smith & Nephew,
significantly reduces the shedding of virus.
Those products combine a gauze pad with a
membrane that allows the passage of air but
not the vaccinia virus. Shedding is reduced by
95 percent and can be further reduced to 99
percent or more if a second layer of membrane
with no gauze is applied over the first ban-
dage.23 CDC advises that “only persons work-
ing in healthcare settings should use semiper-
meable dressings”; members of public health
response teams not involved in patient care can
keep their vaccination sites covered with a
porous dressing (e.g., gauze).24
Since the semipermeable membrane dress-
ing is simple to use, relatively inexpensive, and
greatly reduces the already low risk of trans-
mission to others, why not reduce the risk of
accidental transmission everywhere to the
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lowest possible levels? CDC might further
reduce the risk of accidental vaccination by
recommending that everyone who is vaccinat-
ed pre-exposure, whether in Phase I, II, or III,
should use this dressing, wear long sleeves,
and pay careful attention to hand washing,
particularly after touching the dressing or
touching anywhere near the vaccination site.25
We have not yet specifically considered the
immunocompromised, burn, dermatitis,
chemotherapy, and similar patients who are
in the category of persons at greatest risk. In
the New England Journal of Medicine, Kent
Sepkowitz recently reviewed worldwide case
reports of vaccinia spreading to others in
home and hospital settings from 1907 until
1975. He found 12 instances of spread in
hospitals, with the last death in 1952 in
France. Sepkowitz makes the point that
today the number of patients at risk in hos-
pitals is considerably greater than in the first
two-thirds of the 20th century. He also notes,
“The current plan for an occlusive dressing at
the vaccination site and other now-routine
infection-control procedures, including
hand hygiene and isolation for any patient
with unexplained fever and rash, should
effectively limit potential spread.”26 The U.S.
military operates multiple major hospitals
with wards containing burn patients and
neonates in intensive care, as well as trans-
plant and chemotherapy patients. All are at a
higher than usual risk for accidental vaccina-
tion. The military approach has been to use
the semipermeable membrane dressing for
personnel with patient care responsibilities,
to encourage long sleeves over the dressing,
and, where possible, to rotate workers off
high-risk units until they are no longer shed-
ding virus. Between mid-December 2002 and
mid-June 2003, the military vaccinated more
than 12,000 hospital workers and accumu-
lated 27,700 worker-months of clinical con-
tact time with no transmission from health
workers to patients.27 That is reassuring.
However, there is no doubt that hospitals
should carefully think through staff assign-
ments and infection control procedures as
their workers are vaccinated.28
Assuming Phase II of the national plan is
fully completed and 10 million healthy adults
are vaccinated, we estimate the number of peo-
ple who may die because of accidental vacci-
nation by exposure to a recently vaccinated
person at less than one. Stated somewhat dif-
ferently, most likely, no one will die. As there
are an increased number of immunocompro-
mised persons at risk of death from accidental
transmission today, it is necessary to correct
and increase this estimate. However, the esti-
mate must be increased by more than a factor of
20 to reach one death. (See Table 2, note 1, for
a detailed explanation of this estimate of risk.) 
Two things have changed since vaccination
stopped in the 1970s. There are more people
at risk of vaccine complications, and infection
control techniques have also improved. We
consider both, but in the estimate above we
have given more weight to increased risk than
to improved infection control.
The bottom line: Voluntarily vaccinating
healthy, well-screened adults, using the semi-
permeable membrane dressing for all who get
vaccinated—not just health care workers—and
urging all vaccinees to wear long sleeves until
their vaccination scab falls off makes the
national plan safe for everyone.
What about Recent Reports of Heart
Complications?
Two different types of vaccine complica-
tions involving the heart (heart attack or
ischemic heart disease) and inflammation of
tissues around the heart (myocarditis) have
been widely reported in the recent news. 
One member of the military and four civil-
ians had heart attacks within 5 to 17 days of
being vaccinated. Three died. The patients
were all older (ages 54, 55 [two cases], 57, and
64), with known preexisting heart disease.29
Heart attacks are expected to occur in this age
group. The question is whether vaccination
increases the risk of heart attack. If the num-
ber of heart attacks expected from historical
data is unchanged after vaccination, then it is
reasonable to conclude there is no causal rela-
tionship between vaccination and heart
attack. The military data strongly support
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this conclusion. Historically, on an annual
basis, the military would expect several heart
attacks per week, and that rate has not
changed since the smallpox vaccination pro-
gram began.30 The evidence to date supports
the conclusion that older people, who nor-
mally have more heart attacks, are continuing
to have them at the same rate since we began
smallpox vaccination. However, CDC and the
U.S. military are being cautious and have tem-
porarily advised that people with a history of
heart disease postpone getting vaccinated
until the data have been further studied.31 As
the aims of both the military and the civilian
vaccination programs can be met without
vaccinating persons with a history of heart
and certain other diseases, this caution poses
no threat to the integrity of the overall vacci-
nation program.
Myocarditis is different. Historically, there
have been very occasional reports of myocardi-
tis after smallpox vaccination. Those cases
were mostly mild with full recovery.32
However, a total of four deaths reported from
Finland, the United States, Australia, and
Great Britain since 1947 can reasonably be
attributed to myocarditis secondary to vacci-
nation.33 The most relevant experience
involved 126 Finnish military recruits with
myocarditis admitted to the central military
hospital and carefully studied between 1976
and 1981.34 Ten percent (12 cases) were con-
sidered caused by smallpox vaccination, and
the remaining 90 percent were attributed to
various other viruses and bacteria. All recov-
ered uneventfully. This is the case to date with
the 42 probable and 1 confirmed cases in the
U.S. military and the 10 U.S. civilian cases (as
of June 11).35 The Finns found a myocarditis
rate of 1 per 10,000 in their recruits, and the
U.S. military rate is very similar.36 The strain of
vaccinia used to make the Finnish smallpox
vaccine is different from the U.S. strain. It is
related to the Lister strain, which has more
side effects than the strain used in the United
States (New York Board of Health strain).37 We
can continue to expect occasional cases of
myocarditis with uneventful recoveries. Some
will be due to vaccination and some to other
causes. Deaths, if they occur, will be rare.
Table 1
Smallpox Vaccination: Risk of Death of Healthy Adults
Estimated Total
Risk Group Persons at Risk Deaths Death Risk
Recalculated historical risk of death 126,000,000 68 .5/1,000,000
for all age groups1 or
1/2,000,000
Recalculated risk of death for 45,000,000 8 .2/1,000,000
people 15 and older with historical or
screening1 1/5,000,000
Recalculated historical risk of death 45,000,000 3 .07/1,000,000
for people 15 and older with or
improved screening1, 2 1/15,000,000
1Recalculated risk based on nine years of data (see text).
2This calculation excludes 5 deaths (3 leukemia, 1 Hodgkin's disease, 1 scleroderma). The 45,000,000 figure does not
change because the number of people in the historical denominator with scleroderma, Hodgkin's disease, aplastic ane-
mia, and chronic lymphocytic leukemia was small and the denominator has already been rounded down by 1,800,000.
Further adjustments are not needed and would also suggest a greater degree of precision than is the case.
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Comparing Everyday Risks
and Vaccine Risks
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the vaccine risks
discussed above. Table 3 compares vaccine
risk to the risk of dying on a scheduled com-
mercial U.S. airline flight or the risk of an
adult in the United States dying from an acci-
dent of any type in the next 10 years. Given
that vaccination is no more than a once-in-
10-years event, the comparison with the risk
of accidental death from all causes in 10 years
is reasonable.
We would not expect adults to get revacci-
nated more frequently than once in 10 years
since the protection lasts about that long. Over
the same 10-year time period, the risk of death
from an accident of any type for an adult in
America is 3/1000 or 3,000/1,000,000.38 Thus, a
healthy adult is 42,000 times more likely to die
from an accident in the next 10 years than from
a smallpox vaccination! The risk of death on a
scheduled domestic major airline is between 1
in 8 million and 1 in 10 million.39 A healthy
adult has less risk of death from a smallpox vac-
cination than from flying from Denver to
Washington, D.C. And, as flying is far safer than
driving, when most of us drive to work, to the
movies, or to a vacation destination voluntarily,
we expose ourselves and our companions to far
more risk than a smallpox vaccination does. 
The bottom line: vaccination of healthy
adults is safe. In our judgment, the best policy
guidance that the CDC can offer is: if you are a
healthy adult who does not worry about driv-
ing to work, you should not worry about get-
ting vaccinated or accidentally vaccinating
another person.40
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Table 2
Smallpox Vaccination: Risk of Death of Persons Accidentally Vaccinated
Risk of Death for an
Unvaccinated
Healthy Person/1,000,000
Adults Vaccinated Healthy
Risk Group Vaccinated Deaths Adults
Projected deaths from accidental 10,000,0002 < 1 .09/1,000,000
transmission to account for or
increased number of 1/11,000,000
immunocompromised, etc.1
1Based on 200 cases of accidental transmission and 3 deaths from 28,000,000 vaccinations in 1963 and 1968. As we are
not vaccinating children, reduce accidental infection by 70 percent to 60 cases and, as we can use the semipermeable mem-
brane, reduce by another 95 percent to 3 cases of accidental transmission. When accidental transmission occurred, the
death rate in accidentally vaccinated persons was 3 deaths per 200 cases or 1.5 percent. Therefore the number of deaths
expected from accidental transmission today would be less than one (3 cases x 1.5 percent = .045 deaths). In 1963 and
1968, 10,400,000 persons aged 15 and older were vaccinated. This is close to the target number for the end of Phase II of
10,000,000. The estimated 0.045 deaths per 10,000,000 also can be expressed as 0.0045 deaths of an accidentally vacci-
nated person per million healthy adult vaccinees or 1 death of an accidentally vaccinated person per 222,000,000 healthy
adult vaccinees. As this estimate does not take into account the increased number of persons at risk of death from acci-
dental transmission, we increase the estimate by a factor of 20 and are still at just under 1 projected death of accidentally
vaccinated persons after vaccinating 10,000,000 healthy adults.
Using the same assumptions, but stating the case somewhat differently, a 20-fold increase in susceptibles would lead
to 4,000 cases (200 x 12). Eliminating children reduces this by 70 percent to 60 cases, and using the semipermeable mem-
brane dressing reduces the number by another 95 percent with the same result—less than 1 projected death of accidental-
ly vaccinated persons after vaccinating 10,000,000 healthy adults.
2If 10,000,000 people are vaccinated in Phase II, then, with proper precautions, the number of deaths from accidental vac-
cination could be as low as zero and is unlikely to exceed five.
An In-Depth Look at Why
the Plan Is Stalled
Determining the reasons why the current
national plan to vaccinate healthy adults is
stalled involves not just correcting misper-
ceptions of the risks of vaccination. It
requires analysis of both immediate or obvi-
ous contributing factors and the subtler but
perhaps more important underlying factors
that must be understood if there is to be a
timely, effective, and enduring fix. 
First, medical and public health practi-
tioners and the general public have received
inadequate and confusing information
about the risk of smallpox vaccination to
healthy adults. Because healthy adults are the
only group targeted in the national plan, this
is a serious omission. CDC has never ade-
quately distinguished between healthy adults
who are at low risk of complications from
vaccination and sick adults and all children,
sick or well, who are at far greater risk of vac-
cine complications. Nor has CDC promoted
the wide use of the semipermeable mem-
brane dressing, which greatly decreases the
risk of accidental vaccination of others.
Finally, the ease of control after an event, par-
ticularly the value of vaccinating after expo-
sure to smallpox, has been both overstated
and misstated.41
Result: The perception of vaccine risk by
many medical and public health practition-
ers, as well as by the public, is far greater than
the actual risk. Misperceptions remain about
the spread and control of smallpox after a
bioterrorism event. 
Second, the executive branch has been slow
in proposing or putting in place sufficient cov-
erage for liability and compensation for any-
one who suffers a serious complication or
death, including persons who may become
accidentally vaccinated by close contact with a
vaccinated person as well as the institutions
and providers who do the vaccinating. This
barrier has now fallen, and on April 30 the pres-
ident signed into law the Smallpox Emergency
Personnel Protection Act of 2003.42
Table 3
Smallpox Vaccination: Risks of Everyday Living Compared to Risks of Vaccination 
Deaths per 
Risk Group Million Comparative Risk
Healthy adults vaccinated once 0.07/1,000,000 One death per 15 million
every 10 years healthy adults
Projected deaths from accidental 0.09/1,000,000 One unintended death of 
transmission to account for an unvaccinated person per 
increased number of 11 million vaccinated healthy
immunocompromised, etc. adults
Risk of death from flying once on a 0.1/1,000,000 Flying once has a 1.4 times
commercial airline greater risk of death than
getting vaccinated, or
1 in 10 million 
Risk of death in 10 years from any 3,000/1,000,000 The risks of everyday living 
accident for an adult are 42,000 times greater
than the risk of dying
from vaccination,
or 1 per 333
Note: See text and the notes to Table 1 and Table 2 for an explanation of the numbers in Table 3.
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Result: Widespread hesitation to vaccinate
or accept vaccination due to fears of absent or
inadequate compensation for care of vaccine-
related complications that may result in work
loss, severe illness, and even death. (It is still too
soon to determine the degree to which SEPPA
will help solve this problem.)
Third, a surprising silence on the part of
leaders in the administration from just after
the president’s announcement of his plan on
December 13 until the week of March 10,
when CDC director Dr. Julie Gerberding, Dr.
D. A. Henderson, and the surgeon general
were very publicly vaccinated (President Bush
was vaccinated previously, on December 21).43
But there still has been no good, easily under-
stood, widely available explanation of the
national plan.
Result: A perception that the national plan
is neither well designed nor a high priority.
When those three factors are combined,
far too many people reasonably and under-
standably, but erroneously, are prone to con-
clude that vaccination before an attack is too
dangerous, its complications may not be paid
for, and it probably isn’t very important any-
way. After adding to the mix the natural and
appropriate caution of physicians making
recommendations to patients, it is little won-
der that not many people are getting vacci-
nated. But deeper and more subtle factors
stand in the way of the national plan.
Root Causes of Delay
The threat of bioterrorism extends beyond
smallpox. Many other agents such as anthrax,
botulinum toxin, and plague, to name just a few,
are on the list of potential threats.44 The root
causes of delay that we present below, although
relevant to the smallpox program, are not limit-
ed to smallpox. Thus, some of the lessons we
learn from smallpox should be relevant to our
overall approach to planning for and managing
bioterrorism events by any agent.
Malicious dissemination, whether of
smallpox or other bioterrorism agents, is dif-
ferent from naturally occurring disease.
Though obvious, this distinction is vital.
What we know from naturally occurring dis-
ease may help in bioterrorism planning, but it
is insufficient and, in some cases, misleading.
For example, what worked during the final
years of smallpox eradication when popula-
tion immunity was high, population mobility
was much lower, and there was no malicious
intent to disseminate is not likely to work
today with bioterrorism. In today’s communi-
cation environment, public awareness of a
single case of smallpox will be worldwide
within minutes, and demands for swift action
will run ahead of response capacity.
We emphasize that many members of the
public health, medical, and nursing profes-
sions are participating actively and working
with diligence to prepare the nation for a
bioterrorism attack, whether it involves
smallpox or another agent. Further, we are
not conspiracy theorists and do not believe
any one person, group, or agency is conspir-
ing to undermine the president’s plan.
Rather, a variety of interacting and mutually
reinforcing factors best explains the delay.
Risk and Public Health
Ours is a risk-averse culture. Physicians and
public health personnel are particularly risk
averse and, for the most part, appropriately so.
However, the increasing threat of bioterrorism
demands a new paradigm for balancing
unknown but real risks against the various
costs and benefits of preparedness. This type of
assessment is particularly difficult for physi-
cians who often feel they are violating an ethi-
cal canon if they endorse a certain risk today,
however small, to obviate an uncertain and
unknown risk tomorrow. The justification for
this attitude is the oft-quoted primum non
nocere, or “first do no harm.” This belief struc-
ture and cultural attitude facilitate focusing on
the potential risks of vaccination, without con-
sidering the magnitude or societal conse-
quences of those risks, ways to mitigate them,
or any benefits that might offset the risks. 
The CDC Advisory Committee for Immu-
nization Practices and the CDC National
Immunization Program seem uncomfortable
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with the thesis that an unquantifiable and
probably low risk of attack nevertheless poses a
serious risk to the population. Such a stance
impedes consideration of the following impor-
tant question: If there were to be pre-event vac-
cination, what are the risks to different subsets
of the population? This determination falls
fully within the expertise of ACIP and NIP.
However, neither body has any special expertise
in assessing national security risk (i.e., the risk
of attack) or the social and economic conse-
quences of a bioterrorism attack. They also
have no special expertise in determining an
appropriate plan for either pre- or post-event
control. 
Further, there seems to be a belief among
some health professionals that assessing risk of
attack and risk of vaccination is just too much
for the average American, let alone health care
early responders, to handle and that such
assessment must be kept in the hands of
experts. That assumption is well illustrated by
a passage from an article by Lane and
Goldstein published in March of this year:
We might allow citizens to make indi-
vidual choices about obtaining vacci-
nation after they have been given infor-
mation about the risks associated with
vaccination and potential threat of
smallpox. Public health authorities
would thus cede decisions on a policy
with considerable technical ramifica-
tions to persons with widely varying
abilities to comprehend and weigh the
risks and benefits. The media and the
medical profession would have to
communicate an accurate portrayal of
the data and options. In the absence of
a known threat of smallpox exposure,
this option would be dangerous to
many potential vaccinees, their con-
tacts, and the public health initiative. It
would subject the population to a
known risk for severe adverse events.
The publicity about such complica-
tions might subsequently keep some
persons from accepting vaccination if
the need actually arises. 45
Every day, patients are asked to compre-
hend extremely complex risks and make judg-
ments about them as they consider medical
and surgical choices much more difficult and
with far greater risks to themselves and others
than vaccination. There is neither any basis
nor any right for anyone in the public health
and medical professions to assume that the
public is not competent to make such deci-
sions. It is essential to remember that the prin-
ciple of individuals making their own deci-
sions lies at the heart of our social fabric and
system of government. 
In the words of Thomas Jefferson,
I know of no safe depository of the ulti-
mate powers of the society but the peo-
ple themselves; and if we think them
not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discre-
tion, the remedy is not to take it from
them but to inform their discretion.46
Contributing to the confusion between
national security risk and vaccination risk is the
belief held by some that no one in his right mind
would ever use smallpox as a weapon. After all, it
would spread all over the world and would come
back to bite those who released it. Yet we need
only remember that Soviet premier Mikhail
Gorbachev in the late 1980s ordered smallpox
warheads to be put on Russian missiles to
replace some nuclear warheads.47 It is foolish
and naive to assume our logic and values are the
logic and values of others, let alone terrorists.48
The fact that few observers would have believed,
before it happened, that a terrorist attack on the
scale and scope of the 9/11 attack was plausible
did not keep it from occurring.
Turf Issues
The initial vaccination plan proposed by
CDC in late 2001 and early 2002 was viewed by
the administration as inadequate. Respon- sibili-
ty for development of what became the presi-
dent’s plan was removed from ACIP and CDC by
HHS and the White House. Now the same orga-
nization and many of the same people whose
advice was rejected have been asked to imple-
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ment a plan they did not develop. That unusual
history may help to explain some of the delay
and hesitation shown by CDC. 
There have recently been clear signs of positive
change. Information from CDC is improving,
but it is not yet fully correct or adequate. The
CDC website, a primary source of information
for the several thousand state and local health
agencies in the United States and worldwide, is
much improved but still hard to navigate. On
March 7 HHS, CDC, and the American College
of Preventive Medicine sponsored a “Clinician
Communication Briefing Summary” with HHS
secretary Tommy Thompson, CDC director Julie
Gerberding, and Acting Assistant Secretary for
Public Health Preparedness Jerome Hauer as
speakers under the headline of “Need to
Accelerate the Smallpox Vaccination Program.”49
The briefing confirmed the following:
• Terrorists have demonstrated the intent
to inflict mass casualties on the United
States, and they more than likely have
access to smallpox.
• The administration is concerned that
we are not yet prepared to ward off a
smallpox attack and that we will not be
able to respond if there is an attack. 
• Smallpox preparedness, including the vac-
cination of health care and public health
personnel who would serve on response
teams, is a national security issue. 
• HHS and CDC remain committed to con-
ducting the smallpox vaccination pro-
gram as safely as possible but stress the
need to scale it up and speed it up in the
current context of the situation in the
Middle East and the rest of the world. 
• HHS and CDC are asking clinician lead-
ers to support the smallpox vaccination
program and to assist other clinicians in
health care facilities in making informed
decisions about their willingness to vol-
unteer for the smallpox vaccination pro-
gram.
Those and similar developments are encour-
aging. However, much more is needed, and the
day-to-day actions and behavior of professional
staff within CDC must become far more con-
gruent with the direction set by the director of
CDC and the secretary of HHS (see the discus-
sion of problems with CDC guidance below).
This neither suggests nor requires mind-
less obeying of orders. Rather, it requires that
the professional staff raise and argue different
viewpoints and, when a decision is made,
either agree and support the decision, ask for
reassignment, or resign. As decisions of this
type are argued internally, the different opin-
ions should be shared with the public. Such
openness builds public confidence in the
decision finally taken.
Spillover Concerns
Other Immunization Programs May Be Set
Back. Many professionals in the NIP and on
the ACIP have devoted their lives to getting
parents to immunize their children against a
wide range of childhood diseases as well as
getting adults to accept immunizations such
as the influenza vaccine. They are under-
standably concerned that adverse reactions
to smallpox vaccinations will spill over and
result in the public avoiding other types of
vaccinations that have fewer side effects.
Thus, they may fear that real risks of diseases
that we know are present and can be prevent-
ed will be increased as a consequence of the
public’s reaction to adverse events that may
be associated with vaccinating for a disease
that has yet to reappear. Paradoxically, CDC,
by its alarmist attitude toward smallpox vac-
cination, may be inadvertently fanning irra-
tional fears of all vaccinations.
Smallpox and Bioterrorism Initiatives Undercut
Far More Important Public Health Efforts. Some
public health professionals feel that the entire
bioterrorism initiative, and its smallpox focus
in particular, take away from other far more
needed public health programs and, without
more specific additional funding for smallpox
and bioterrorism, the fabric of public health is
at risk. Certainly more funding dedicated for
bioterrorism would be welcome, but these
concerns are exaggerated. One of us (WB) is a
former state commissioner of public health,
who knows what it takes and is taking to
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respond to bioterrorism and smallpox. For
example, it is frequently said that “everyone is
working on smallpox.” That is a substantial
exaggeration. The chronic cries of bureaucrats
need to be dramatically discounted.
Budget cuts in public health funding,
sometimes very severe, have occurred in many
states. However, it does not follow that federal
bioterrorism funds are or could be fungible
and available for general support of public
health at the state and local levels. Although a
number of reports have observed that the unit
cost of administering vaccine pre-event is high
and possibly prohibitive, that is partly due to
the inaccurate information about vaccine safe-
ty that keeps clinics operating at very low vol-
umes. If clinic volumes were higher and inte-
grated into routine immunization and other
medical care activities, unit costs would be
much lower. 
Smallpox and bioterrorism are often seen
as an opportunity to get new money.
However, when public health officials make
the unsubstantiated assertion that, for bioter-
rorism initiatives to succeed, it is necessary to
strengthen the rather vaguely defined “public
health system,” the argument is weak. What is
the exact logic that links the “public health
system” to effective response to bioterrorism?
Further, what exactly is the “public health sys-
tem,” and which parts of it are essential to an
effective bioterrorism control program? Until
those questions are answered convincingly
and with precision, substantial new money is
unlikely to flow to public health agencies. 
There actually are some convincing answers.
We strongly support enhanced public health
laboratory capacity at the state level; enhanced
disease surveillance and early warning systems;
and strengthened, proactive, epidemiologic
intelligence capacity at the state and local levels.
Investing in those public health activities makes
sense for an effective bioterrorism response,
and it is a good example of a dual-use invest-
ment. For example, investment of this type
could help with SARS and monkeypox today as
well as in the identification and management of
other diseases totally unrelated to bioterrorism
but of public health importance.
Problems with CDC Guidance 
Although we believe the burden of bioter-
rorism on state and local health agencies has
been overstated, it is true that state and local
efforts have been greater than needed because
guidance from CDC has been confusing,
needlessly complex, and sometimes wrong.
One example will suffice. Because of serious
errors in content, long known to CDC, the
entire national post-event federal planning
guideline for state and local health agencies
was removed from the CDC website on
January 27.50 Then, for one additional month,
the nation was without any national post-
event guidance. On February 27 new guidance
was posted without either explanation or any
clear statement about what was new and how
the guidance to state and local health agencies
had changed. It is unfortunate that all post-
event state plans were developed within the
framework of CDC guidance to the states that
was known to be flawed.
Since February 27, 2003, CDC guidance
has substantially improved.51 However, as
erroneous information was posted for over a
year and widely disseminated in the media,
public and professional awareness of changes
remains limited. Therefore, major changes
need to be highlighted and brought to the
attention of professionals and the lay public
through the media. In clearing up continu-
ing misperceptions, the following points are
of particular importance:
1. Transmission of smallpox is very possi-
ble and should be assumed before the
appearance of any visible rash.
2. In a bioterrorism outbreak states should
plan to move to local mass vaccination
as they also identify and vaccinate easily
identified contacts of the first case or
cases.
3.Vaccination after exposure, particularly
within three to five days, is likely to prevent
death but is unlikely to prevent disease and
further spread of smallpox. Therefore,
though valuable for individuals, it has lim-
ited value in planning for post-event con-
trol in the general population.
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4. Fast and effective post-event control is
critically dependant upon completing
substantial pre-event vaccination as called
for in Phase II of the president’s plan.
Points 1 and 2 are now clearly and consis-
tently expressed in current guidance. Point 3,
as previously noted, remains flawed,52 and cur-
rent CDC guidelines, though modified, still
use the words “will prevent” in guidance to
state and local agencies and to the general pub-
lic.53 As yet, Point 4 does not appear to be
acknowledged. 
Silence of Most State and Local Health
Officials
State and local health officials, with some
notable exceptions, have been silent about the
inadequacies of CDC plans and information.
Yet many of those professionals have perceived
the plans as confusing and not feasible. Why
have they been silent? Smallpox is a new area
for most state and local agencies, while CDC
has people who have seen and worked with
smallpox. Thus, it is reasonable to give CDC
the benefit of the doubt. Further, CDC pro-
vides money to state and local agencies.
Speaking out is perceived as putting funding at
risk and degrading otherwise good and colle-
gial professional relationships. Finally, state
and local officials are part and parcel of a risk-
averse culture that discourages making waves
and rocking the boat. Given that the constitu-
tional authority for protecting the public’s
heath remains at the state, not the federal, level,
this is particularly troubling.54
Political Concerns
The smallpox threat was seen by some as a
Bush administration ploy to gain support for
the war against Iraq. Therefore, any support
of vaccination was seen as an endorsement of
war. Variants of this theme include concerns
such as, “If I support vaccination I am sup-
porting the president’s social policies and
legislative program, which undermine public
health.” It is not necessary here to debate the
pros and cons of the administration’s posi-
tions on other issues. It is only necessary to
realize that individual political opinions on
topics that really are not related to the small-
pox threat are shaping the judgments and
recommendations of some public health and
medical practitioners. 
Systems Thinking and the
Culture of Public Health
To fully understand why the president’s
smallpox vaccination plan has been delayed,
we must dig even deeper and consider how
public heath professionals think and the
extent to which the culture of public health is
relevant or antithetical to national prepared-
ness for bioterrorism.
Smallpox expert Dr. D. A. Henderson
warned as early as 1999 that malicious dis-
semination of smallpox by bioterrorists could
be disastrous.55 There is much to support his
opinion, and it is not unreasonable to con-
clude that this risk is the primary rationale
behind the president’s plan.56 However, there
are powerful voices that still say smallpox is
difficult to transmit and maintain that the
lessons of control from the eradication years
are valid today.57
It is essential to recognize that eradication
took place over a period of more than 10 years
when the level of population immunity was
growing, populations were far less mobile
than today, and there was no malicious intent
to disseminate smallpox.58 The persistent
inability of many public health professionals
to grasp the importance of these points sug-
gests that systems thinking—seeing how the
pieces fit and interact—is not sufficient in the
profession. Consider the CDC director’s state-
ment that the true measure of the president’s
pre-event vaccination plan is whether the
entire nation could be vaccinated within 10
days of an attack. Juxtapose that with the
words of others in CDC: “It would be a suc-
cess if no one receives the vaccine, but we
offered this opportunity to all the right peo-
ple.”59 Because the speed of post-event vacci-
nation is directly dependent on the number
of vaccinators willing to expose themselves to
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the risk of smallpox, the smaller the number
of immunized vaccinators, the faster small-
pox would spread across the country. Further,
if neither health care workers nor the general
population are immunized, our hospitals and
medical care system will be at grave risk of
being swamped and losing significant capaci-
ty after a smallpox attack. That is exactly what
the president’s plan was designed to prevent.
It is difficult to comprehend how no pre-
event vaccination can be called a success. 
The above is but one example of inade-
quate systems thinking in moving from the
macro level—the overall approach to pre- and
post-event smallpox planning—to the micro
level of how clinics will work and determining
what exactly must take place to avoid bottle-
necks in the distribution and administration
of vaccine. For example, having prepositioned
at the state level vaccine supplies that are suf-
ficient to begin substantial vaccination as
soon as a case is identified would speed up
initiating a control program by at least 12 to
24 hours. As demonstrated by Kaplan, Craft,
and Wein, many public health officials fail to
realize the importance of response logistics in
determining the outcome of a bioterrorism
event.60 That misunderstanding is emblemat-
ic of the widespread but dangerous devalua-
tion of the benefits of applying sophisticated
yet pragmatic systems approaches to small-
pox and bioterrorism planning. 
Inadequate systems thinking about small-
pox lies within a larger construct. Public health,
by its very nature, prefers to deal with events
once full data are available. It eschews making
proactive decisions when nothing has yet hap-
pened, as is the case with the threat of smallpox
when there is no attack and no illness. 
However, in emergencies with lethal poten-
tial, far-reaching decisions may have to be
made on the basis of very limited data.61 That
type of emergency situation requires thinking
that is completely contrary to the usual think-
ing of public health professionals. Typically, a
good public health professional
collects good and complete data,
analyzes with care,
plans and involves concerned constituencies,
prepares within the framework of the plan,
acts if needed, and
evaluates and revises.
That is a time-consuming and risk-mini-
mizing approach for the public and for the
professional. It is consistent with the risk-
averse culture that permeates public health
and medicine. It works well for much of pub-
lic health decisionmaking, but it is not cor-
rect for decisionmaking with regard to
bioterrorism, whether it involves smallpox or
another agent, where decisions may need to
be made with little data and less time. 
Sweeping decisions based on limited data
run counter to the culture of public health.
Opting for pre-event national vaccination is
just such a sweeping decision. Post-event
decisions will also have to be made on the
basis of fragmentary, inadequate data and
will require fast, even draconian, action with-
out the certain knowledge that the action
will, in hindsight, be correct. This too is anti-
thetical to the culture of public health. We
posit that such will be the case whether we
are dealing with smallpox, anthrax, or other
agents. 
Once you take your pick of several under-
lying forces and mix them with more imme-
diate causes for delay, it becomes easy to
understand why the national pre-event vacci-
nation plan is stalled. Is the situation serious?
Yes. Is it catastrophic? No. We have enough
vaccine to vaccinate the entire country in case
of an attack. But instead of vaccinating rapid-
ly within 10 days, with our current level of
preparedness, we could easily take one to two
months, with needless spread of disease,
avoidable deaths, and much suffering and
economic loss. We can muddle through. But
muddling through at the expense of hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of lives is not good
enough. 
We are focusing only on the limitations of
public health with regard to bioterrorism and
are not making a sweeping indictment of pub-
lic health. However, we submit that much of
what is good about public health may stand in
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the way of effectively planning for and respond-
ing to bioterrorism. Rather than ask a work-
horse to be a racehorse or vice versa, let’s debate
the desirability of creating a structure that
draws only on those elements of public health
that can contribute to an effective response to
all bioterrorism agents. We are concerned about
efforts to make the public health apparatus
into something it isn’t and shouldn’t be. This is
exemplified by the recent letter to the director
of CDC from the Institute of Medicine's
Committee on Smallpox Vaccination Program
Implementation.62
The Institute of Medicine Committee letter,
though containing some useful recommenda-
tions, is flawed. Equating smallpox prepared-
ness with chronic disease and obesity and sug-
gesting that responses to such diverse threats
to health should be integrated strains creduli-
ty. The statement that “ . . . a high level of pre-
paredness may well be possible without vacci-
nating any personnel pre-event” is wrong, irre-
sponsible, and dangerous. In another part of
their letter, the committee suggests that indi-
vidual states may have goals of vaccinating
their populations in 2 to 10 days. The impossi-
bility of achieving either with no pre-event vac-
cination is not mentioned. Later, the commit-
tee says, “It is unclear . . . how numbers of vac-
cinated personnel relate to the ability to
respond effectively to a smallpox attack.”
These and other inconsistencies and contradic-
tions are obvious yet not addressed by the com-
mittee. In yet another place the committee sug-
gests that in a post-event situation it may not
be possible to immediately vaccinate everyone,
so plans should be made for “prioritizing cate-
gories of vaccinees . . . pre-event” or rationing
access. We can only speculate about the prob-
lems of crowd control when access to vaccine is
needlessly denied in the face of a disease with a
30 percent fatality rate. Although the commit-
tee mentioned the military have vaccinated
over 450,000 people, they failed to comment
on the fundamental finding from the military
experience that smallpox is a safe vaccine when
administered with care to healthy adults. In
brief, the IOM letter illustrates poor risk assess-
ment and inadequate systems thinking that
neither serve good public health nor support
sound national preparation for a possible ter-
rorist release of smallpox.
What to Do?
Short Term
The CDC needs to clearly articulate the
rationale for the president’s three-phase plan
and, within that rationale, specifically include
the basis for the number and categories of peo-
ple to be vaccinated pre-event. It must develop
and publicize a fair, understandable, well-doc-
umented assessment of vaccination risk that is
updated as new information becomes avail-
able. Since CDC has, so far, been unable to
accomplish either objective, it is likely that rig-
orous oversight by HHS and Congress will be
required to make this happen.
Another important short-term measure
involves reducing the risk of accidental vaccina-
tion of others by recommending the use of the
semipermeable membrane dressing for every-
one who is vaccinated, not just hospital workers.
CDC and other health policy officials in
the Bush administration should explain
clearly to the public the key details of recent-
ly approved vaccine compensation coverage
and how it is linked to workers’ compensa-
tion and other disability income insurance. It
should be emphasized that very few people
will have events that trigger the need for com-
pensation.
The secretary of homeland security and the
White House should reaffirm the importance
of the National Smallpox Vaccination Pro-
gram and meet with leaders of medical, hospi-
tal, and nursing associations and relevant
unions, to stress that this is a national security
issue, the risk to healthy adults is minimal,
there is a good approach in place for liability
and compensation, and the nation needs their
help.
Medium Term
To ensure that bioterrorism response plans
are adequate, President Bush should require
CDC and HHS to jointly empanel an advisory
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group that has expertise in systems analysis and
operations research, public administration,
public health and behavioral science, hospital
and medical care administration, law, epidemi-
ology, and clinical medicine, including infec-
tious diseases. The panel should have military
representation as well. Most of the members
should be fresh faces, not people drawn from
existing committees and agency working
groups. The charge to the panel and its staff
would be to critically examine and test all bioter-
rorism plans—not just those for smallpox—to
identify weaknesses, propose changes, and ulti-
mately ensure their adequacy. The underlying
question should be: Are the plans adequate for a
worst-case scenario? That requires analysis of
pre- and post-event plans as well as of the inter-
action between federal and state plans. It cannot
be limited to federal plans alone.
Though bioterrorism is a public health
issue, the primary impact of bioterrorism will
fall on the acute care system, particularly hos-
pitals. That is where people go when they are
sick or think they are sick. We must recognize
that our hospitals, especially their emergency
rooms, are a critical first line of defense against
bioterrorism. But after two decades of reim-
bursement policies driven by managed care
competition in the private sector and adminis-
tered pricing for public-sector programs, hos-
pitals are operated on a “just-in-time, just-
what’s-required” basis. For an adequate hospi-
tal-sector level of preparedness, critical issues
of surge capacity and shortages (staff, equip-
ment, and facilities) and the need for adequate
government funding for bioterrorism pre-
paredness and response must be addressed.
What can be learned from our approach to
smallpox? What must be done to ensure that
we are adequately prepared, not just for small-
pox, but for all bioterrorism hazards? What
can we learn from the recent military experi-
ence with vaccination? Are there ways to capi-
talize on the strengths of CDC and state and
local public health agencies while addressing
weaknesses in systems thinking and commu-
nication? Is the culture of public health suffi-
ciently malleable to allow, even to foster, rapid
decisionmaking with vast consequences based
on very limited data? As the best possible
preparation for and protection against bioter-
rorism is in all our interests, those questions
and more merit public discussion and debate. 
A Note on SARS,
Monkeypox, and Public
Health
The onset and spread of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome and monkeypox have
dominated public health headlines in recent
months. SARS, although infectious and com-
municable and thus akin to smallpox, has
been appropriately addressed by the applica-
tion of classic public health epidemiologic and
laboratory methods. SARS is less infectious
than smallpox and has a lower mortality rate.
Its impact develops far more slowly than that
of anthrax and botulinum toxin. An under-
standing of SARS, what it is, and how to con-
trol it can be determined only by rapid, but not
precipitous, epidemiologic and laboratory
investigation that pays exquisite attention to
all possibly relevant details. SARS differs sub-
tly but significantly from bioterrorism, and it
exemplifies where classic public health can
shine. In the case of bioterrorism, thorough
investigation and retrospective analysis prior
to taking fast and sweeping action is more
likely to ensure failure than lead to success.
SARS does dramatically demonstrate that
hospital workers may be particularly vulnera-
ble and hospitals can serve as epidemiologic
pumps contributing to the spread of disease
as they struggle to control the same disease.
Most notably, the economic and social conse-
quences of even a small epidemic like SARS
already have been vast. 
Monkeypox reminds us that we must expect
the first case of smallpox to be identified slowly.
Initiating civilian vaccination at our current state
of preparedness will be neither easy nor fast. 
Finally, SARS and monkeypox demonstrate
the ease with which infections can be transmit-
ted in our era of easy, worldwide air travel and
the impact of rapid, global communication on
how citizens and governments respond. 
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Conclusion
With sufficient vaccine and VIG, the nation
now has the material, but not the human,
capacity to rapidly control a bioterrorist small-
pox outbreak. Pre-event vaccination of
10,000,000 medical, public health, and emer-
gency workers is central and essential for rapid
post-event control. However, few health and
emergency workers have opted for voluntary
vaccination. The overt reasons are
• inadequate and misleading vaccine risk
information provided by CDC,
• delay in passing liability and compensa-
tion legislation, and
• insufficient education about and sup-
port for vaccination by key leaders in the
administration directed to the public
and key professional groups.
Further, a variety of subtle but powerful
underlying reasons is delaying vaccination and
weakening post-event planning. Perhaps the
most important are deficient systems thinking
in public health and a public health culture that
prefers to be reactive rather than proactive. 
In the near term, far better information
about the risk of vaccination along with a clear
rationale for the president’s plan are needed.
With the passage of compensation legislation,
the administration now needs to reemphasize
that vaccination is safe and that our nation’s
security requires the timely completion of the
national pre-event plan. Those actions will effec-
tively neutralize the weapons potential of small-
pox. The only reason for less preparation would
be that the national intelligence assessment sup-
ported a conclusion that the threat of dissemi-
nation is significantly reduced or absent.
In the medium term, the adequacy of our
pre- and post-event response plans for all
bioterrorism agents should be subjected to
critical, multidisciplinary analysis. Those of
us in the health professions need to consider
if and how public heath expertise can be
made more relevant to planning for and
managing bioterrorism events. However we
organize to combat bioterrorism, further
questioning of premises and conventional
wisdom is likely to illuminate weaknesses
and suggest more robust approaches.
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